I found this excellent summary of the judgements of a host of committees, reports, and individuals on the subject of pre-war intelligence and intelligence manipulation.
1. Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq
a) Found no evidence of attempts to influence analysts to change intelligence.
b) Found that Joe Wilson's report, rather than debunking intelligence about purported uranium sales to Iraq, actually bolstered the case.
c) Found that contrary to Wilson's assertions and even the government's previous statements, the CIA did not tell the White House it had qualms about the reliability of the Africa intelligence that made its way into 16 fateful words in President Bush's January 2003 State of the Union address.
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/iraq.html
2. The Commission On The Intelligence Capabilities Of The United States Regarding Weapons Of Mass Destruction (Robb-Silverman Commission)
a) Found that the Presidential Daily Briefing contained similar intelligence as the National Intelligence Estimate given to Congress but expressed it in more alarmist and less nuanced language.
b) Reported that the intelligence in the Presidential Daily Briefings was not markedly different than the intelligence given to Congress in the National Intelligence Estimate.
c) Found no evidence that intelligence analysts were pressured into issuing false aseessments.
http://www.wmd.gov/report/
3. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission)
Found no evidence that Bush manipulated intelligence.
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/
4. Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction (Lord Butler Report)
Found no evidence that intelligence--much of it used by the U. S.--was distorted.
http://www.butlerreview.org.uk/
5. Investigation into the Circumstances Surrounding the Death of Dr. David Kelly (Lord Hutton Report)
Found that British Prime Minister Tony Blair did not manipulate intelligence, much of which was used by the U. S. This report forced two heads of the BBC to resign.
6. David Kay, former head of Iraqi Survey Group
Testified to Senate Armed Services Committee that U.S. intelligence analysts were not pressured into giving false assessments of the threat posed by Iraq.
http://www.cnn.com/2004/US/01/28/kay.transcript/
7. Charles Duelfer, former head of Iraqi Survey Group
Stated that U. S. intelligence analysts were not pressured into giving false assessments of the threat posed by Iraq.
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2004_cr/roberts050304.html
8. Australian Government’s Report of the Inquiry into Australian Intelligence Agencies
Found no evidence that the Office of National Assessments (ONA) was influenced by policy or political considerations to conclude--as did U. S, and British intelligence agencies--that Iraq had significant WMD stocks.
http://www.pmc.gov.au/publications/intelligence_inquiry/chapter3/2_iraq.htm#aust_lessons
Isn't it amazing how rare it is for any of these determinations, much less all of them, to appear on the nightly news?
The conclusions of these groups are highly credible because it was reached in the open, in fair ways, with ample scrutiny from elected officials, constituents and a free press. They are by nature not partisan conclusions, but analytical ones.
It can't be stressed enough that journalism has become an exercise in transcription, not unlike a court reporter, except no one is under oath. One wonders if they will ever get the message that we need no longer rely on them to tell us what is. And, that if they continue to exist in this institutional fantasy, they will cease to be a part of the discussion entirely.
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